Part 1  The Theory of Faith Hirohumi Hoshika

Chapter 3 Establishment of the Apostolic Faith (9)

Proposition 3 Christianity Proposition 3: Religiosity B

The philosophy of Kierkegaard, known as the father of existentialism, is one that emphasizes subjectivity, with the fundamental tenet that "subjectivity is truth". [1] Even if an objective truth were to exist, it would be meaningless unless it were the truth for me. "Even if the objective content is true, it becomes untrue depending on the person who accepts it". [2] In other words, while the object of one’s belief is important, one’s relationship to it is even more important.

Such assertions by Kierkegaard were directed, on the one hand, against the speculative philosophy of Hegel, and on the other, against the corruption of faith within the Christian churches of contemporary European society. How can we accept Christian doctrine, which is considered to be objective truth, as our own truth? This was his philosophical problem.

In the "Stages on Life's Way", Kierkegaard divides life into three stages: "aesthetic", "ethical", and "religious". The "religious life", which he described as the final stage of life, was later divided into "religiosity A" and "religiosity B" in his major work, "Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments".

The innate aesthetic inclination to seek what is desirable eventually evolves into an ethical inclination while dialectically negating the self — here, "dialectically" is used in the Hegelian sense, not the Socratic one; that is, not through dialogue with others but through self - discipline within one's own thought—and ultimately, by recognizing the limits of the self that seeks ethical perfection, leads to a religious way of life that takes the Absolute as the foundation of existence.

Here, "Religiosity A" refers to the case where the Absolute is sought within the self, while "Religiosity B" refers to the case where it is sought outside the self; Christianity is argued to be a religion founded upon "Religiosity B".

Furthermore, these two forms of religiosity are not said to arise as two distinct categories from an ethical stage, but rather are considered to develop in stages: one first progresses to "Religiosity A", and then, after recognizing the dialectical contradiction — namely, that the self seeking truth lacks truth — reaches "Religiosity B".

In other words, at this final stage, the initial banner proclaiming "subjectivity is truth" is lowered, and in its place, a new existentialist banner declaring "subjectivity is falsehood" is raised. [3]

In this way, it can be said that Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christianity accurately captures the nature of Christianity, which places truth outside of human beings. However, a careful reading of his work reveals that his understanding of the negation of subjectivity merely implies that there is nothing on one's own side worthy of belief; it becomes clear that the “subjective passion” involved in subsequently seeking that belief outside oneself is maintained to the very end.

In other words, Kierkegaard's concept of "Religiosity B" does not involve a dialectical development of subjectivity itself within existentialism. Furthermore, it is understood that this does not go so far as to negate the emphasis on subjectivity that was initially put forward.

If Kierkegaard's philosophy was indeed existential philosophy in the true sense of the term, it should have called into question the very status of the principle of subjectivity itself, such as subjective passion and subjective decision. Just as the students who threw themselves into the leftist movement from the 1960s through the 1970s were eventually forced to engage in self-criticism for enrolling in universities—the very institutions at the heart of the state system they criticized, no, even without relying on such a leftist self-criticism— just as the primal casualness of "going to university first, then figuring things out" was, in its very essence, utterly intolerable.

This is because the Hegelian dialectic he inherits is not merely a logical progression of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; rather, it is a tripartite movement that comes into being when a single individual simultaneously embraces these conflicting ideas and, while suffering, discovers a resolution arising from that very contradiction.

However, even in Kierkegaard's final position, "Religiosity B", this subjective passion was not questioned in a self-denying way. This may be because Kierkegaard believed that such a subjective will is the power of faith, and that there is no way for faith to be established if one abandons such a will.

Setting that point aside, the concept of "Religiosity B" — which he sought to grasp but failed to reach (in my view) — can be found in biblical figure. There, we are taught that a lack of subjectivity is precisely the path to drawing closer to faith.

Luke chapter 10 contains a scene where the sisters Martha and Mary welcome Jesus as He is on his way to Jerusalem. At that time, the younger sister, Mary, sat at Jesus' feet and listened to his words. Martha, who was busy serving, grew irritated and complained to the two of them, but Jesus replied to her, "Mary has chosen the good part."

The interpretation the Church offers regarding Mary in this instance focuses above all on her zeal in prioritizing listening to Jesus's words, and that is how I, too, heard it explained. That is, this approach seeks to find "Religiosity A" — the idea that "subjectivity is truth" — in Mary. Since there is no absolute right or wrong in interpretation, this view is certainly possible; however, I believe it is more appropriate to see "Religiosity B" in Mary.

It appears not to be the case that Mary, who listened intently to Jesus, was praised by him because she maintained a consistent attitude of putting faith first and, consequently, tossed aside the mundane chores of hospitality to hear his words on this occasion.

If Mary's zeal is what is being praised, then from an existential perspective, her conduct does not differ from Martha's in that she prioritizes what she considers important. Moreover, isn't an interpretation that seeks to portray Mary as strong-willed entirely out of place in the picturesque scene Luke describes — that of "Mary sitting at the Lord's feet"?

It is natural to view Mary's act of sitting at Jesus' feet — rather than attending to him — not as an expression of her fervent faith, but as a result of her realization that she was not someone who could do something on her own, but rather someone who needed Jesus to act for her.

Helplessness, vulnerability, and a lack of confidence in one's ability to give are forms of existence that seek fulfillment and can serve as catalysts for faith. Here, a "Martha-like" existence — one that appears to be self-determined — is a path that does not lead to faith; subjectivity is falsehood, and non-subjectivity is truth.