| Part 1 The Theory of Faith | Hirohumi Hoshika |
Others shy away from religion out of concern for its association with fundamentalism. Why should fundamentalism be rejected? Is it because it is based on an uncertain doctrine? Certainly, a distinction must be made between evidence-based knowledge and dogma-based faith.
Fundamentalism should be rejected. The straightforward reason is that fundamentalism violates the rights of others. In other words, it is the same as a crime, but fundamentalism is accompanied by justification based on ideology or belief.
Fundamentalism is the belief that it is permissible or right to practice one's espoused beliefs even if it means violating individual rights like of which are normally recognized in a democratic nation.
This is not only seen in extreme cases such as Jehovah's Witnesses refusing blood transfusions for their own children, the "powa" practices of Aum Shinrikyo, and suicide bombings by religious fundamentalists, but also in situations that do not amount to a violation of legal right, such as the hostile attitude sometimes seen among believers toward their own families, or the lack of consideration for passersby when promoting their religion on the street.
As a result, many people today feel that it is intrusive to reject the faith or non-belief of others from a particular religious standpoint. They have no problem with people having a particular faith, they believe it is a matter of personal freedom.
However, they feel that if a person believes that his own religion is the only correct one, he is narrow-minded and self-centered, even if he does not actually assert this to others. "What is right is different for each person. Don't you understand that?" is what irritates them towards those involved in religion.
Nevertheless, those who view thoughts and beliefs in this way do not know the distinction between truth and right. Indeed, Christianity threatens the truth of others――I think that's what a thought or belief should be――, but it does not threaten the rights of others.
If Christian truth, that is, the Christian faith, can be communicated with disregard for the rights of others――historically, this was not an anomaly――, then the Church too has been ignorant of the distinction between truth and right.
Evangelism is the act of influencing religious beliefs to others, but in this case, the evangelist is not allowed to act like a doctor who can act based on scientific knowledge without the consent of the other person. Missionary activities require some form of consent from the other person. This can be done by gaining the other person's trust in advance, or by gaining social recognition by showing that the activity is conducted by a church institution.
In any case, when we communicate something that we believe to be more important than life and death, we must always prioritize the consent of people who do not understand this because it is faith, not knowledge. In other words, we believe that what is communicated there must be accepted of one's own free will and cannot be conveyed by coercion.
However, at the same time, this is also because we have a basic understanding of the relationship between truth and right, that religious activities should not violate the rights of others. The religious truths we believe in are communicated under the rights of others.
Even for doctors who practice medicine based on scientific knowledge, if we consider that the patient's consent is necessary in actual treatment situations, then not only religious truths but also scientific truths are under the rights of others.
Even if a person refuses blood transfusions due to the influence of certain doctrine, or a person of a primitive society who refuses injections because he believes illness to be the work of "spirits," he should be protected from coercion. What must be done in this case is persuasion, not coercion. Here too, individual rights should be understood to be placed above truth.
In other words, the first principle for protecting ideologies and beliefs from fundamentalism is that right takes precedence over truth, whether the truth stated is religious or scientific. As long as this principle is observed, no religion will lead to fundamentalism.
However, this is not the only structure of the conflict.
In the Jehovah's Witness blood transfusion trial, it was a young child who had difficulty making decisions for himself that the doctor attempted to perform a medical procedure on. Parents who are believers have the freedom to refuse blood transfusions, but the issue at stake was whether this right extends to their children. There may be cases where, like quarantine policies to combat infectious diseases, failure to enforce them will lead to the spread of harm.
Should we understand that in these instances scientific truth trumps individual rights, that is, truth trumps right?
Even if we were to think this way, it would at least be limited to the case of actions based on scientific truths that are generally recognized to be certain. When religious truths are uncertain in the eyes of others, it does not follow that it can be placed above individual rights.
So even in this case where it can be assumed that "truth trumps right," the door is not opened to religious fundamentalism.
However, in this situation, it would be more accurate to say that what is occurring is not a conflict between truth and right, but a conflict between rights. In the case of Jehovah's Witnesses, the right to life of a young child is threatened by the parents' "right to have their faith not interfered with", and in the case of an infectious disease, the right to life of the masses is threatened by the sick person's "right to freedom".
In such cases, it is normal to leave the matter to the discretion of the law, so the second principle is that disputes between rights are decided by the law.
Therefore, when beliefs or ideas cause conflict, it is important to determine whether the conflict is between truth and right, or between right and right. Furthermore, in a conflict between truth and right, right must be placed above, and in a conflict between rights, the law must be placed above.
As long as this principle is maintained, any religion will be clearly distinguished from fundamentalism. In other words, fundamentalism is a way of thinking that affirms placing one's espoused truth above the rights of others, whereas in a healthy faith one's own truth is always placed below the rights of others.
However, it goes without saying that the second principle must be prefaced with the phrase "in situations where religion is protected under a democratic state governed by the rule of law."
This is because in countries where "religious freedom" is not guaranteed, conflicts of rights arise between religion and the state, and in such cases religions naturally cannot hope to appeal to the legal system of such a country. Only in this case would religion be justified in acting as an authority alongside the state.
I haven't exhausted my argument yet, but it's becoming a obvious discussion, so I'll leave it at that. Last, for religious people who feel uncomfortable bringing up the concept of "rights" to deny fundamentalism, I would like to point out the following.
Those who think this way would likely argue that the denial of fundamentalism is included in the teachings of the religion they believe in, and that "any legitimate religion would not be fundamentalist." Quite true, but the way this argument is formulated, it is likely to become a battle between fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist religions, i.e., between religions, and an endless debate about the truth of "what is the true teaching."
In the first place, "human rights" is a concept proposed by Christian thinkers such as Locke and Rousseau during the establishment of modern states in Western Europe. Constitutions are made by men, and men are subject to the laws they make. In the same way, Christianity submits itself to the concept of "human rights" which has been extracted from within itself. This is the basis for stating here that truth should be subject to rights.
At the end of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Ricardo Rorty writes:
"Rather, solidarity is the ability to gradually see traditional differences (of nationality, religion, race, customs, and so on) as less important compared with similarities in terms of pain and humiliation, to see people who are quite different from us as included within the confines of 'us'". (Paraphrase).
In public, he says that it is far more important for people to be free from cruelty than religious truth or the pursuit of human nature. What society needs is not "supreme truth" or "true love," but simply the guarantee of minimum rights and freedoms.
Naturally, Christianity cannot be satisfied with this, but we should agree that in society, it is asserted that the basic rights of human beings must be protected against all truth claims, that is, that rights must take precedence over truth.